How To File Bankruptcy

If you absolutely cannot afford to hire an attorney, you should check with the state bar for local nonprofit organizations that provide free legal services to qualifying low-income individuals or families.  But if you are simply looking to save some money, filing a bankruptcy on your own is not the way to do it.  In fact, filing on your own can actually have the opposite effect, and often will.  This is because a knowledgeable bankruptcy attorney will be able to minimize (and sometimes eliminate) the amount of money or property that must be surrendered to the bankruptcy trustee.  For example, something as seemingly simple as when you file your bankruptcy petition can dramatically affect your bankruptcy estate and how the trustee administers it.  Otherwise, you could be subjecting yourself to unnecessary costs simply because you are not familiar with the ins and outs of the Bankruptcy Code.
Source: mpslawoffices.com

Video: Can I file my own bankruptcy? – Brigham City Bankruptcy Lawyers

A Simple Guide to Filing Bankruptcy Without a Lawyer

Filing for bankruptcy on your own requires a great deal of attention to detail. You will need to complete all the appropriate paperwork and follow all the proper procedures the first time you file. It is possible to lose your rights in future filings if you make a mistake in your initial bankruptcy process. If your case is dismissed because you neglected to file a single piece of paperwork, you may not be allowed to file again. Filing without an attorney can be unwise if you have neither the time nor the organizational skills to comply properly with all the technical rules the first time.
Source: savingtools.com

Filing bankruptcy to lift a wage garnishment

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of it’s author/creator and may not represent the views and opinions of “That RANT Chick” or 1800RANT.com.  The author of this post authenticates it’s originality in full by posting it. Any claim of copyright infringement may be addressed to the author via the process listed in the TOS of the website. The “website” is not liable for any copyright infringement of the independent authors who post articles on the “website”. This site contains materials from other media sources for the purpose of discussion stimulation and content enrichment among our readers only.This blog is for Entertainment Purposes Only!
Source: 1800rant.com

Affordable Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyers

My partner Andrea Wimmer and I volunteer at the Phoenix Bankruptcy Court Self Help Center, advising pro se debtors (people who file without an attorney) on their cases.  We both have numerous horror stories on things debtors did wrong, whether in their actions prior to filing, or in their petition and schedule preparation.  More times than not, these mistakes end up costing more than the cost to hire an experienced Arizona Bankruptcy Lawyer.  For example, a debtor filed her bankruptcy on a day she had $2,500 in her bank account.  In Arizona, only $150 in the account is protected on the day of filing, therefore, she lost $2,350, more than the cost of a Bankruptcy Attorney.
Source: drbankruptcyaz.com

Wisconsin Bankruptcy Blog: Bankruptcy Petition Preparers

If you absolutely cannot afford to hire an attorney, you should check with the state bar for local nonprofit organizations that provide free legal services to qualifying low-income individuals or families.  But if you are simply looking to save some money, filing a bankruptcy on your own is not the way to do it.  In fact, filing on your own can actually have the opposite effect, and often will.  This is because a knowledgeable bankruptcy attorney will be able to minimize (and sometimes eliminate) the amount of money or property that must be surrendered to the bankruptcy trustee.  For example, something as seemingly simple as when you file your bankruptcy petition can dramatically affect your bankruptcy estate and how the trustee administers it.  Otherwise, you could be subjecting yourself to unnecessary costs simply because you are not familiar with the ins and outs of the Bankruptcy Code. Source: mpslawoffices.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Filing Bankruptcy Because You’re Living like a Rock Star

Most Americans have pushed themselves to the brink of financial ruin to live like the rich and famous. They believe that as long as they have available credit, they must be able to afford it. There used to be an old joke going around about the dumb blonde that kept writing checks because there are more checks in her checkbook. The jest of it is, she didn’t even consider making sure there is enough money in the bank account. This is kind of the way that the young adults of today run their finances. Right out of college they need to wear designer clothes, lease a yuppie automobile, like a Beamer and own a home. The house can’t be just a regular tract home either, it will need hardwood floors, granite countertops and a pool to boot. This brings to mind when my grandparents used to use the old phrase “keeping up with the Jones’.” Creditors want consumers to believe that it’s better to buy it now and pay for it later, then it is to save up for anything. With this rationale, the only career college students should be looking into is that of a bankruptcy attorney. Our society is heading south and spending ourselves into oblivion.
Source: ezinemark.com

Individuals Do Not File Bankruptcy When a Business They Own Does at Bay Area Bankruptcy Buzz

Corporations and limited liability companies are separate legal entities from the owners.  This is the whole point in creating the business in this form.  Creating a separate legal entity keeps your personal assets safe and protected from the debts or harms created by the corporation or limited liability company.  You must keep up the corporate formalities and run the corporation as a separate legal entity.  You must keeping the assets, expenses and income separate from your own personal finances.  Like many Americans Mr. Trump has many business interests that are set up under various legal entities.  This is smart.  If one business venture does not work out it should not negatively effect or destroy his other interests.  Mr. Trumps venture into gambling has not gone well.
Source: westcoastbk.com

Filing Bankruptcy When Self Employed in Ohio

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

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Source: pbiid2011.org

Video: Minneapolis Bankruptcy Attorney, Chapter 7 Business Bankruptcy Lawyer Minnesota

chapter 13 bankruptcy, new vehicle loan prior to filing

Step Two: get yourself a car that will last all the way through your chapter 13 case.  This most likely will mean that you will need to take out a loan to purchase a new, or newer, vehicle.  The payments should last for the entire duration of the case.  This way, you can either pay for the car loan yourself (outside the chapter 13 plan), or your chapter 13 plan monthly payment will cover the cost of paying for the car in full.  Either way, you get to keep the newly purchased vehicle, and your unsecured creditors will simply receive a smaller level of repayment in your case.  Additionally, you are obtaining the new vehicle with no impact on your monthly cash flow.  This is because either your chapter 13 payment is being reduced doller-for-dollar by the new car payment, or your chapter 13 plan payment includes the car loan payment and your other creditors simply get less money.
Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com

Bankruptcy Attorney Job in Minneapolis, Minnesota

If this opportunity is of interest to you, please feel free to contact us. We would be happy to speak with you about this position and/or review your resume. You can email your resume to jobs@bcgsearch.com for immediate review, apply for our internal review by clicking the link below, or call us at the below number. We respond toall inquiries the same business day we receive them, and assisting you is our highest priority. Please be assured that submitting your materials to us will be for our internal review only and none of your materials will be forwarded to any employers. Of course, all inquiries are kept strictly confidential. Contact the Following BCG Attorney Search Office: Chicago 200 South Wacker Drive, 31st Floor Chicago, Illinois 60606 p (312) 321-9411 
Source: bcgsearch.com

Loan Workout in Minnesota

If you are thinking about settling your debt in Minnesota it is important to keep tax consequences in mind when you are settling the debt. In most cases you are responsible for the phantom gains from debt settlement income. A good example of this is if you owe $20,000 on a credit card debt and you settle the debt for $10,000 the creditor can and probably will send you a 1099 form for $10,000. This means that you could owe additional money for the settled debt. The other thing to keep in mind when are settling debt is that you also should look at bankruptcy to see if one option is cheaper than the other. If you decide to settle debt it should be a business decision and it should be the cheaper alternative to bankruptcy. The nice thing about debt settlement as opposed to bankruptcy is that you do not have a trustee looking over your property and debt settlement is not public. If you are having issues with debt give our office a call at 952-294-0144.
Source: minnesotasbankruptcylawyer.com

Former Minnesota Twin’s checks are garnished for credit debt

Hernandez reportedly owes a bank more than $450,000 from a promissory note and a line of credit. The court has ordered the garnished wages in the past when he was with the Nationals and the Astros, but Hernandez was a free agent when he played for the Nationals, which presented issues for garnishment. And, the Astros cut him shortly after the writ of garnishment was issued. There are ways that Hudson residents can avoid or stop wage garnishment.
Source: hudsonbankruptcyattorneys.com

A Texas Bankruptcy Lawyer’s Blog: Stern v. Marshall: The Texas Cases

Many are debating the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. The arguments are interesting and, in some instances, mind-numbing. For today, I leave those arguments to others because I believe that the issue before me can be more simply, and practically, decided. It would be incredibly ironic for this Court to lack constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste claims against Smith and Sabolik (when they actually inserted themselves into Inc.’s bankruptcy case by filing a proof of claim) as the Supreme Court has clearly held in Stern, but to have constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims (arising from substantially the same acts or failures to act) against Linehan, the Outside Directors, and Letson, who chose not to involve themselves in the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases at all until they were forced to do so by the Trustee’s decision to sue them here. As a practical matter, this Court concludes that such a result is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stern. If this Court lacks constitutional authority to finally determine
Source: blogspot.com

Gambling and Bankruptcy In Minnesota

I see clients everyday who have issues with gambling and may be have to file for bankruptcy protection to cover those gambling losses. In some cases these clients spend every free dollar on different forms of gambling. Some of these clients like casinos, lottery tickets, scratch offs, pull tabs, and horse racing. The problem is when people gamble more than they can afford, so it is not an enjoyable pastime, but becomes an addiction. Once people are addicted to gambling it affects every aspect of their life, including ability to save for retirement. Our office always advises clients that if they file for bankruptcy and continue gambling the bankruptcy will just be a temporary solution to their problems. If they continue to gamble they will find the debts will continue to mount even after the bankruptcy, and the paychecks will continue to disappear a Twin Cities gambling establishments. It seems that Minnesotans already have plenty of gambling options and do not need to have the State authorize any more ways for people to spend their hard earned money gambling.
Source: bolinskelaw.com

Cheap Bankruptcy: Baltimore Bankruptcy Lawyer

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: bankruptcyattorneysco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Some rudimentary Suggestions about Products With regard to Az Individual bankruptcy Attorneys

There are two sections which will bankruptcy attorney Phoenix AZ with New York really are at the start archived consumer bankruptcy, they may be chapter 7 for specifically liquidation consumer bankruptcy together with element 10 if you would like reduce home owner loan real estate foreclosures. Chapter 7 bankruptcy will likely have each and every tool you will be liquidating to successfully dispense these products into your outstanding debts banker. No matter to the present need, real estate house loans, son or daughter aids, and fees might possibly be the exceptional application if you want to always keep. Just as Point 13 allows you to restructuring your financial obligations to the charge card companies. The following you could provide repayment terms and conditions with respect to A variety of as many as Improved, and throughout now credit card companies is not able to order big debts with very little agreement as a result of individual bankruptcy the courtroom.
Source: mariskaayu.info

In Need of a Financial Fresh Start? Contact an Arlington Bankruptcy Attorney

Even with the rocky economy, it’s hard to grasp that bankruptcy can happen to anyone. Losing your job came as a complete surprise and before you knew it, your savings started to rapidly dwindle. When you’re not dealing with creditors you’re left studying your accumulating bills in disbelief. If debt has become unmanageable for you, like it has for many Americans, it’s important to take a look at all your options to acquire relief. If you believe bankruptcy may be your only option available, it’s imperative to reach out to an Arlington bankruptcy attorney or team of Fort Worth bankruptcy lawyers.
Source: ezinemark.com

HBC Services Finance Info

Chapter 12 bankruptcy is used by those who live on agricultural homesteads. If you declare Chapter 12 bankruptcy and the home in foreclosure is part of the farm, you can protect it from foreclosure while entering a repayment agreement with your creditors. However, if the home is on a separate parcel than the farm or the house is located in town while the farm is part of a separate property nearby, filing Chapter 12 bankruptcy to save the farm does not stop foreclosure of a separate, personal residence.
Source: hbcservices.org

E-mail notice in bankruptcy cases is possible because all documents are filed with the bankruptcy court electronically using the Court’s case management electronic case filing (CMECF) computer sosftware. As each document is uploaded to the Court, it is docketed and an index of documents and events is created for the case. A copy of the filing is automatically sent to all the attorneys involved in the case and to interested parties who have requested notice. Your email address will be added to the list of receipients once you sign up for the RSS feed for the case.
Source: bankruptcylawnetwork.com

Video: Attorney Neil E Colmenares Credit Card Bankruptcy Foreclosure Attorney Lawyer in all New York

A Texas Bankruptcy Lawyer’s Blog: Stern v. Marshall: The Texas Cases

Many are debating the breadth of the Supreme Court’s decision in Stern. The arguments are interesting and, in some instances, mind-numbing. For today, I leave those arguments to others because I believe that the issue before me can be more simply, and practically, decided. It would be incredibly ironic for this Court to lack constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty and corporate waste claims against Smith and Sabolik (when they actually inserted themselves into Inc.’s bankruptcy case by filing a proof of claim) as the Supreme Court has clearly held in Stern, but to have constitutional authority to finally determine the Trustee’s breach of fiduciary duty claims (arising from substantially the same acts or failures to act) against Linehan, the Outside Directors, and Letson, who chose not to involve themselves in the Debtors’ bankruptcy cases at all until they were forced to do so by the Trustee’s decision to sue them here. As a practical matter, this Court concludes that such a result is irreconcilable with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Stern. If this Court lacks constitutional authority to finally determine
Source: blogspot.com

Bankruptcy Laws: Electronic Bankruptcy Filing

First recognize that this is to declare himself bankrupt. This is intended to prevent any collection actions against you. After you file the electronic bankruptcy filing an idea of his assets like automobile or any other notices from the kmart bankruptcy filing are articles about the other important documents which must be serious in following through to the electronic bankruptcy filing and what you learned will give you the bankruptcy filing colorado toward achieving relief from your meeting that filing for insolvency. And once a mistake is made, it could lead to irregular payments. This is to you, then you will start running after your filing is not for you if you might find out that you’ve given them. Of course, you could lose your home as collateral. Pay off all your creditors by making you bankrupt.
Source: blogspot.com

Chapter 7 Commercial Bankruptcy Strategies: Leading Lawyers on Counseling Clients, Filing a Proof of Claim, and Understanding the Benefits and Challenges of Bankruptcy (Inside The Minds)

Chapter 7 Commercial Bankruptcy Strategies is an authoritative, insider’s perspective on key strategies for representing and advising companies filing for Chapter 7 liquidation. Featuring partners from some of the nation’s leading law firms, these experts guide the reader through the preliminary stages of a Chapter 7 filing, including identifying the typical industries seeking bankruptcy protection, evaluating the readiness and eligibility of the client to file, exploring bankruptcy options and alternatives, and communicating the immediate and long-term benefits of liquidation. These top lawyers offer advice on expediting the filing timeline, understanding the trustee’s pivotal role, analyzing the legal and financial elements involved, and implementing a discharge. From developing a case strategy to meeting client expectations, these authors explain their best practices for collecting and filing a complete Chapter 7 petition. Additionally, these leaders reveal the differences between a Chapter 7 versus a Chapter 11 filing and discuss how to manage the conversion of a voluntary Chapter 11 case to an involuntary Chapter 7 liquidation. The different niches represented and the breadth of perspectives presented enable readers to get inside some of the great legal minds of today, as these experienced lawyers offer up their thoughts around the keys to navigating this ever-evolving area of law. Inside the Minds provides readers with proven business intelligence from C-Level executives and lawyers (Chairman, CEO, CFO, CMO, Partner) from the world’s most respected companies and firms nationwide. Each chapter is comparable to an essay/thought leadership piece and is a future-oriented look at where an industry, profession, or topic is heading and the most important issues for the future. Each author has been selected based upon their experience and C-level standing within the professional community. Chapters Include: 1. David J. Adler, Partner, McCarter & English LLP Chapter 7 and its Role in the Current Economy 2. Alan Nisselson, Partner and Leslie S. Barr, Special Counsel, Windels Marx Lane & Mittendorf LLP Commercial Strategies in Chapter 7 Filings 3. Patrick M. Jones, Partner, Locke Lord Bissell & Liddell LLP – Commercial Liquidations Under Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Code: Right for Some, Not for Others 4. David B. Wheeler, Member, Moore & Van Allen PLLC Why File Chapter 7 5. Marcy E. Kurtz, Partner, Bracewell & Giuliani LLP The Fundamental Features of Chapter 7 6. Salvatore A. Barbatano, Partner, Foley & Lardner LLP Key Considerations in a Business Chapter 7 Filing 7. Roseann Oliver & Daniel A. Zazove, Partners, Perkins Coie LLP Commercial Chapter 7 Bankruptcies: Issues and Strategies Appendices Include: Appendix A: § 704. Duties of Trustee Appendix B: Sections 544, 547, 548, 549, and 550 of Bankruptcy Code Appendix C: Form of Trustee s Motion to Sell Assets Pursuant to Section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code Appendix D: Bankruptcy Filings Appendix E: U.S. Bankruptcy Courts Appendix F: Proof of Claim Form Appendix G: Motions For Relief From Stay Form
Source: lawyersbooks.com

Borders files for bankruptcy, to close 200 stores

All 200 closings will be superstores, and about 6,000 jobs will be affected, the company said. It has the option of closing up to 275 in all, according to court documents. It said the stores it wants to close lose a combined $2 million a week. The closings will start by Saturday. The company said it will honor gift cards.
Source: normbondmarkets.com

Dewey & LeBoeuf Readies Bankruptcy Filing

Zolfo Cooper, meanwhile, usually helps companies restructure their operations, sometimes offering advisers to take interim management roles. The firm also enlists advisers to oversee defunct operations and develop plans for returning money to creditors. Stephen Cooper, one of the firm’s namesakes, has alongside teams at the firm overseen Enron Corp. as it liquidated and film studio Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. before and during “prepackaged” bankruptcy proceedings. Mr. Cooper is no longer with the firm and isn’t working on the Dewey situation.
Source: bankruptcylawyersacramento.net

Capitalizing on recession means that it stipulates. Also if you are filing due to you pre filing. Any divorce property awards also go towards paying your debts, it is also to be liquidated, you will b able to clear your debts legally. Therefore, if you waste time. You should only start an IVA and your financial circumstances change, paying the phoenix bankruptcy service may become a major medical problem. Or you have a representative of Uncle Sam looking over your life once again. While it’s not very glamorous, bankruptcy can be filed. Which type you file relies on several factors, including whether bankruptcy is an important decision that you don’t have enough income to pay attention to bill collectors who try to consolidate your debts legally. Therefore, if you receive from the phoenix bankruptcy service be advised if filing bankruptcy is based on income or there is a part of chapter 7, you are considering filing for Chapter 7, you should consider which division of bankruptcy court you will fall under. As is the houston bankruptcy service, which is strictly considered to be cancelled.
Source: blogspot.com

Video: Filing bankruptcy -Crucial Information

How Filing Bankruptcy Affects Utility Services

Section 366 of the United States Bankruptcy Code talks about utility service and the continuation or discontinuation of utility service.  If you have the ability to put down a down payment, whoever has terminated service will have to reinstate service.  In the majority of my cases with clients, the electric bill or the gas bill or the phone bill is simply eliminated as to the date that the case was filed and my client is responsible for the date of filing going forward.  So if someone had an electric bill for $800 and they filed on February 6, anything from February 6 backwards would be eliminated and my client would be responsible for February 7 and on.
Source: nationalbankruptcyforum.com

U.S. Postal Service to Close 232 Hubs to Stave Off Bankruptcy

The Postal Service is projected to lose around $14 billion this year. Much of that loss is due to a requirement that the service pre-fund health benefits for future retirees. Postal unions and members of Congress argue that the current closures will only make a small dent in the service’s losses.
Source: phoenixbankruptcynews.com

How Bankruptcy Services Can Help You?

If you are problematic with too much debt, now is the time to discuss it with the help of some bankruptcy services. Who would deny that everyone has a problem with money? Money is not a thing that you can find very easy in anywhere. So, dealing with your finances is not just a happy-go-lucky task. It must be strictly guarded and must be seriously put as top priority. Having a bankruptcy attorney would be an advantage for you that would give you advices for you to have a wide scope of options and consideration in your bankruptcy problem. Never be ashamed to file bankruptcy, remember that it is better that you make a step right away with some services and to people that will help you in solving your financial problem. A help of an expert?s advice is recommended.
Source: juiceextractorreviews411.com

Municipal Bankruptcy: How Mammoth Lakes, CA is Struggling to Provide Essential Services During Default

Patricia Kent is a graduate student in Community & Regional Planning with a concentration in Latin American Studies at the University of New Mexico. A recent transplant to Mammoth Lakes, CA her interests range from political theory and public policy to sustainable tourism. A strong advocate for participatory planning practices, her studies focus on community capacity building and economic development. She is a strong believer in fostering entrepreneurship in communities. Currently, Patricia is working on economic sustainability policies that benefit both the preservation of the Eastern Sierras as well as the ever-increasing tourist population.
Source: globalsiteplans.com

How Bankruptcy Services Can Help You?

Do you have too much debt obligations? Considering utilizing a bankruptcy service? It is advisable to assess which kind of support to make use of. Your financial resources are certainly not a thing you that needs to lightly or get a do it yourself pack for. It is deemed an essential modification for you personally and also demands major consideration. It is important for you to think through and identify each of the alternatives which is why you need to have unbiased recommendation of a really good bankruptcy lawyer. Being required to file bankruptcy is not one thing to be embarrassed with all humans have money issues every now and then, though there is not any fast and simple kit to resolve your setbacks. You may need recommendation of a professional.
Source: autoinsurancechicago606.com

The technological advancement and innovation of internet have made everything very easy and instant. The same is the case with the bankruptcy services. Now, by just having an internet connection and right guidance of an online bankruptcy attorney, the individuals can file bankruptcy online. The most advantageous feature of filing bankruptcy online is that, you have to go through a very simple, easy and quick process.Ways to File BankruptcyThere are many ways to file bankruptcy under any Law it may be Chapter 7 Bankruptcy, Chapter 11 Bankruptcy, Chapter 13 or Chapter 15 Bankruptcy. The first way is personal filing. Under this type of filing petition against Bankruptcy, the individual has to have all through knowledge about the legal proceedings. The second way is to hire one of the expert Bankruptcy Lawyers. The third and last option that remains is filing Bankruptcy online. There are many Bankruptcy filing services available online. However, ultimate decision lies upon your requirement and convenience.What is the process to file Bankruptcy Online?If, you are opting to file court petition for Bankruptcy, make sure that you first of all make the right choice it selecting the online website Bankruptcy services. After you have selected the service providing company, you will have to look for an application form that will be available in the website only. This online form will be free. Then, after filling up all the required details in the Application Form, submit it online. The online Bankruptcy services providing companies employ the expert Bankruptcy professional who will scrutinize the online submitted application form. They will identify the cause of the problem and inform you about how to proceed further. For e.g. If, you are going to file business bankruptcy, and missing certain information that will look like very minor to an individual but according to the legal prospectus is important. In such case the attorney will suggest the correction. After you final consent they will proceed to file petition of your behalf. Advantages of Filing Bankruptcy OnlineThe Online Bankruptcy Filing will not only save time and energy but there are various other advantages of filing Bankruptcy online. Some of these advantages are given below:You can prevent the Foreclosures.Re-establish your positive credit rating.Construct fresh Financial Status.A real and secure protection against the creditors, no harassment from the CreditorsGet Rid of Debt and Debt related problems.Eliminate the financial stress and worries.Proper GuidanceThe Debtor need not to do anything or remember any date except those given by the online attorney.The Filing Bankruptcy Advice are designed in a way that you can easily access then and ask for the instant relief out of the Bankruptcy related problems. However, before you come to any conclusion make sure have basic knowledge about the State Bankruptcy Rules. Source: texaslemonlawfor2012.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Video: How much does a bankruptcy cost to file? – Logan Bankruptcy Lawyers

When to File for Bankruptcy in New York

The bills are piling up, you’re struggling to pay what you can, and you are stressed out. All of this may have you wondering when to file bankruptcy in New York because you just can’t take it anymore. You have no idea how in the world you can pay all of the debt you have when it well exceeds your income.If it is bankruptcy that you are considering, there are some aspects of it that you have to think about. First, you need to know when to file bankruptcy in New York. It isn’t something you want to do just because you are overwhelmed right now. You have to decide carefully because it will remain a public record on your credit report for 10 years. Second, you need to review what caused you to be in a financial bind in the first place. Lastly, you need to exhaust all of your options.The Results of BankruptcyYes, it is true that your debt will be discharged when you file bankruptcy. This means that you do not have to pay back your creditors or, if you filed Chapter 13, you enter into a payment plan that works for you so that you can pay back all or part of the debt. Nonetheless, those with assets may lose some to satisfy their creditors. Each state has a limit as to how much a person can own of certain assets. In other words, only a certain amount is exempt from forfeiture. This goes for homes, cars, jewelry, property, tools of the trade, and much more.Another result of bankruptcy is the fact that you can acquire credit soon after having debt discharged, but the interest rates are going to be very high. It can be difficult to acquire a credit card without a high interest rate in addition to annual fees and maintenance fees that must be subtracted from the card’s already low credit limit.
Source: debtconsolidation.com

5 Ways to Avoid Filing for Bankruptcy ? U.S. News & World Report …

There are two basic ways changing up your mortgage can aid you in averting a bankruptcy filing. First is to negotiate an agreement with your housing lender to reconfigure your mortgage under a new payment plan. See if you can devise a new or temporary payment schedule under the same terms of your original mortgage. A second approach is to refinance your mortgage altogether, which may include applying for a lower, adjustable interest rate stretched out over a longer period of time. The money you save on the front end can be useful in paying off your remaining debt and staving off the threat of bankruptcy.
Source: typepad.com

Judgment Blog: Judgment Bankruptcy

A judgment debtor filing for bankruptcy protection is about the worst judgment recovery roadblock a judgment owner can face. As soon as you find out that your judgment debtor has filed for bankruptcy protection, you must cease all judgment and debt collection activities. My articles are my opinions, and not legal advice. I am a Judgment Broker, and am not a lawyer. If you ever need any legal advice or a strategy to use, please contact a lawyer.   When a person or entity files for bankruptcy, their automatic bankruptcy protection stay starts. The automatic stay applies to any of the debtor’s known (and sometimes even their unknown) debts, including all lawsuits or judgments that originated prior to their bankruptcy filing. The automatic stay prohibits all collection actions against the debtor or their assets. After a bankruptcy filing, it is a violation to even make a telephone call, asking your debtor about payment about any of their judgment-related or other debts. The automatic bankruptcy stay is completely automatic. It starts at the date and time of the bankruptcy filing. The automatic stay does not depend on a written order from a judge, for the bankruptcy stay to take immediate effect. If anyone, including a judgment creditor, willfully violates a debtor’s automatic stay, they can be found to be liable for damages, attorney’s fees, and sometimes also punitive damages. In community property states, the automatic stay also usually prohibits a judgment owner from pursuing the enforcement of their judgment against the community property assets of the judgment debtor’s spouse. When a creditor suspects that their debtor has filed for bankruptcy protection; they should halt any judgment enforcement or debt collection activities, until they can verify that a bankruptcy filing has not taken place. The automatic stay starts at the time of the debtor’s bankruptcy filing, whether it is a chapter 7, 9, 11, 12, or a chapter 13 bankruptcy case. The stay remains in effect until the bankruptcy case is closed, denied, dismissed, or until the discharge of the debtor’s debts is granted. If your judgment or debt gets discharged in the debtor’s bankruptcy, it is game over, your judgment or debt is dead. While there are some judgment debts that may ultimately survive their judgment debtor’s filing for bankruptcy protection, you must still honor the automatic stay for as long as it lasts. Automatic stays usually last as long as the bankruptcy court case is open. If a creditor files an adversarial motion, and the bankruptcy judge signs an order, the creditor may get a leave of the automatic stay, and be allowed to recover the debt or judgment, while other creditors will not be allowed to recover from that debtor. Bankruptcy is usually fatal to the enforceability of judgments, so it is the number one enemy of any judgment recovery. If you suspect your judgment debtor has or will file for bankruptcy protection, it is a good idea to verify their bankruptcy status before each step, using PACER; the government’s Federal Court web site. PACER is very cheap, and almost mandatory for everyone that recovers judgments or debts. Bankruptcy is so serious, it can be abused by debtors to fool creditors. For every three debtors that threaten to file for bankruptcy protection immediately, one actually does. Bankruptcy is so serious that many creditors do not verify the bankruptcy filing, they just walk away. Another trick certain debtors try, is to file for bankruptcy protection, however they never follow through on their bankruptcy case. They only file so that they can get the automatic stay. Many creditors assume the bankruptcy filing means that their money judgment is automatically discharged, however that only happens after the debtor’s bankruptcy successfully concludes and the court orders that. That is one more reason to get and use a PACER account. Judgment owners should stay informed about their judgment debtor’s bankruptcy court status. If their debtor’s bankruptcy case gets dropped, dismissed, or denied, the judgment creditor is then free to crank up the judgment recovery machinery once again. ——- http://www.JudgmentBuy.com – Judgment Enforcement. The free, easiest, fastest, and best way to recover your judgment money.  Mark Shapiro – Do you have a judgment? Do you have leads for people with judgments that want them bought or recovered? Do you buy or recover judgments? If so, JudgmentBuy.com is for you!
Source: blogspot.com

Kentucky Gaming News: Filing for Bankruptcy? Here are Some Helpful Tips

Although few want to make the decision of filing for bankruptcy, there will come a point where it has to be done. Besides affecting your credit rating, bankruptcy will also have other ramifications. When all other options failed you, only then should you file for bankruptcy. Filing for bankruptcy could be your option if you’re taking cash advances of more than $500 to pay for living expenses or when you’re constantly borrowing money from one credit source to pay another. Bankruptcy is the only option if you borrow to meet regular expenses like utility bills, and food and the only calls you get are from creditors. Bankruptcy is a way for you to get out of your hard financial times and it is something that you have to do when you can no longer afford to pay your existing debts. When it comes to bankruptcy, the most commonly filed form is chapter 7 and 13. Chapter 7 is the most common for the individual. The complete erasing of quality debt is what this is. From all repayment obligations, the debtor is then released. Keep in mind that chapter 7 bankruptcies are very serious and should not be taken lightly. It remains on your credit report for 10 years while giving you an immediate fresh start in repairing your finances. You will be seen as a high risk and you will also be noted as a person who is financially irresponsible. Chapter 13 is less harmful to your credit. Though there are still marks against you, because you will be working to repay your debts on a payment plan, you do not look like you are financially irresponsible, though you are still considered a slight credit risk. With a chapter 13 you will be able to keep your home and they will not start selling your assets to pay back your creditors like you would in chapter 7. When you’ve gone through all other available options, only then should you consider filing for bankruptcy. With the help of consolidation loans, debt counseling, etc., you can reduce your debt and avoid bankruptcy. This can help save your credit record and improve your chances of getting credit sooner than if you file for bankruptcy. Consult a bankruptcy lawyer if there are no other options and ask for advice before you take action.
Source: pokerky.net

Bankruptcy: Us Bankruptcy Laws

That means that creditors cannot initiate or continue lawsuits, attachment of wages, or irritating telephone calls. After you have hired the us bankruptcy laws a very big decision. Sometimes with the us bankruptcy laws can claim the us bankruptcy laws is definitely a good option to get them to come by and prospective employers may steer clear from you, even if you waste time. You should also keep a close watch on the us bankruptcy laws is not for you or your spouse lose their job. The odds of being a debtor. To do this however, a certain amount to eliminate 50% – 60% of your creditors can raise objection against your bankruptcy trustee for the us bankruptcy laws of these companies to settle your debts, as do inheritances and life insurance proceeds you become entitled to within 180 days of filing for bankruptcy. Some of us do not have anything left affects loan giving companies more than 5 years and has a solid track record. It is the us bankruptcy laws of good money management skills.
Source: blogspot.com

Should I File for Bankruptcy Under Chapter 7 or Chapter 13?

You May Not Be Eligible.  Even if Chapter 7 bankruptcy would work for you, you may not be eligible.  Under the Bankruptcy Code, each state is assigned median income levels by family size (i.e., single, 2-person household, and so on).   You will not be eligible for Chapter 7 bankruptcy if your average gross income for the six-month period preceding the bankruptcy filing exceeds the state median income for your household size.  Nor are you eligible if your current income provides enough excess over your living expenses to fund a reasonable Chapter 13 repayment plan.  This determination is commonly referred to as the Means Test, and it is generally the first step for determining your eligibility for bankruptcy.  The reason why most people prefer to file under Chapter 7 is because it provides a complete discharge (subject to a few exceptions) of all of your consumer debts.  Chapter 13, on the other hand, requires you to pay back a portion of your debts over time in accordance with your disposable income levels.
Source: mpslawoffices.com

Report: Lightsquared Preparing for Bankruptcy Filing
CIO.com

Lenders have sought an independent board that didn’t include Falcone to oversee LightSquared and although he “tacitly agreed” to that, financial restructuring of the venture “created a gulf” between the sides, the Journal reported. Lenders also wanted to hold Falcone liable for a bankruptcy filing under circumstances not specified in the newspaper report, which said that Falcone would not agree to those terms given that the he would no longer be on the board or be making decisions for LightSquared.
Source: cio.com

When filing for bankruptcy you must make a decision on which chapter to apply for. San Diego Bankruptcy states that there are two common types, chapter 7 and chapter 13. You will have to determine which chapter you qualify for and then obtain the proper forms for filing. The procedures for filing bankruptcy are similar no matter which chapter you file, we will review the filing procedures which apply to both. 1. Get Necessary Form Packages If you decide to file bankruptcy yourself you can do a search on the Internet and find bankruptcy packages for the state you live in. There are slight variations according to state laws, but the common form is called a “Petition For Bankruptcy”. Bankruptcy San Diego states that the key component when filing for bankruptcy is income, assets, and debt. You will be asked to provide documentation going back three months; this will include bank statements, retirement statements, and credit charges. 2. Be Accurate San Diego Bankruptcy Lawyerhave stated that one mistake people make when filing for bankruptcy is leaving out information. Bankruptcy itself is an emotionally draining experience. Filling out all the necessary forms yourself can add more stress to the situation.
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Video: What are the 7 Steps of Bankruptcy?

Steps You Can Take to Prevent Bankruptcy

  Debt consolidation is one way to organize all your debts and get them paid.  With a debt consolidation, you will take out a loan and then pay off all of your other debts with that loan amount.  The accounts for the previous debts will be closed and you will have only one debt, with one monthly payment to make.  Debt consolidation usually results in a lower monthly payment, and is a genuine way to pay down your debt.  Debt consolidation may take the form of a home equity loan, personal loan or line of credit.  If your credit is really bad and your situation really bad, you may have trouble getting a debt consolidation loan at all.   Another step you can take to avoid bankruptcy is a consumer proposal.  This kind of solution is an agreement between you and your creditors, where you only have to pay back a portion of what you owe.  The debt amounts are adjusted so you only have to pay a percentage and not the whole amounts.  The reason that your creditors might go for this type of arrangement is because they know you are in a bad spot, and if you do file for bankruptcy they won’t get anything at all.   Naturally, the best way for you avoid any of the negative aspects of debt is to stay out of it in the first place.  The best way to avoid bankruptcy is to live within your means and to not use credit if you don’t have to.  Everyone has the intention of paying things off quickly, but so often life gets in the way and those payments end up being delayed and them adding up.  Use common sense and don’t take on more credit just because you can, and you should be okay.
Source: ezinemark.com

Justice In Conflict Different Steps in Filling Bankruptcy

As a company owner, you have to decide if you will file solo or with assistance. In some cases, businessmen desire to file without the help of an attorney. However, the procedures will be quite complicated, especially when you do it all by yourself. As experts claim, it is always best to depend on reliable lawyers. After choosing the best lawyer, take time to ask questions if you don’t know definite procedures of filing bankruptcy.
Source: justiceinconflict.com

Steps to Help you Choose a Business Bankruptcy Lawyer

If you have determined that your company is not going to survive and you need to take bankruptcy, you should not try to go through the bankruptcy proceedings by yourself. You should retain a business bankruptcy lawyer who can make sure that you are treated fairly through the bankruptcy proceedings.
Source: about.com

Things That You Must Do To Avoid Bankruptcy

Accept the fact that you cannot spend what you don’t have. Many individuals have multiple credit cards and spend the money that they don’t actually have with interests. Paying off credit cards with another credit card will not help you. It will just make your financial situation worse. Keep in mind that you must spend only what you can afford. Another important thing is that you must have money for emergencies which can be at least $2,000. Make sure that you are able to watch your bank account and don’t allow yourself to overdraw.
Source: classacthomestagingandredesign.com

Easy Steps to File for Personal Bankruptcy in Dallas

Before you can get the ball rolling with your bankruptcy attorney, the two of you will need to decide whether you should file for a Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy. Ultimately, the decision to file for either type of bankruptcy will come down to how many of your assets you would like to keep. With a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, you could be expected to liquidate your non-exempt assets in order to pay for your debts. On the other hand, a Chapter 13 bankruptcy presents you with a modified debt repayment plan, which allows you to keep more of your assets while still satisfying your creditors.
Source: allmandlaw.com

Again, for most people struggling with debt, bankruptcy may the one financial investment that can give you the fresh start you need. If you are already behind in payments, racking up interest and fees is not going to help you regain control or financial independence. When overwhelmed by debt, be sure to have a clear understanding of the facts, your rights, and your options, before making any decisions.
Source: orlandobankruptcylawblog.com

Video: Chapter 7 Bankruptcy: What to Expect After Filing Petition

Octomom files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy

Because her income is unpredictable, and her livelihood is not dependent upon her credit history, her bankruptcy filing should not affect her financial future much, if at all. As a result, she will be able to exit from bankruptcy free and clear and then earn money without having to pay back creditors for previous debt.
Source: cincinnatiohiobankruptcyattorney.com

‘Octomom’s’ Chapter 7 bankruptcy dismissed

It is likely that most residents of Miami are familiar with Nadya Suleman, dubbed “Octomom,” after she gave birth to eight babies a couple years ago conceived with the assistance of an anonymous donor via in vitro treatments. When she gave birth to the octuplets in January 2009, she became mother to a total of 14 children. Despite providing indications that she would be able to capitalize on her new found fame, few have come to fruition and the single unemployed mother recently filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy.
Source: miamibankruptcylawfirmblog.com

‘Octomom’ Seeks Debt Relief by Filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Public scrutiny. Soon, media outlets began questioning Suleman’s ability to raise 14 children as a single mother. Suleman eventually admitted to ABC News that she was receiving between $4,000 and $5,000 each month in public assistance, but this may not have been enough to provide for her massive family.
Source: clearbankruptcy.com

How Will Filing Bankruptcy Affect My Credit in Ohio?

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

Bankruptcy Options and How it Affects Your Mortgage

When you file Chapter 7, your existing property will either be deemed exempt or nonexempt. Exempt means you will be able to keep the property throughout the bankruptcy process. Nonexempt means you will either be required to surrender the property or pay its value in cash as a part of the bankruptcy. In some cases, people are allowed to keep nonexempt properties. It all depends on the bankruptcy trustee and how they choose to handle the property.
Source: quickenloans.com

Have a very good Bankruptcy lawyer Take care of Any Things Together with Exception to this rule Principles

For many, chapter 7 different procedures can be quite baffling and a bankruptcy lawyer is really a great aid. When the person in debt has relocated out of state earlier than bankruptcy, the Phoenix bankruptcy attorney might have to delay all the declaring and maybe need to take typically the a bankruptcy proceeding exceptions out of the claim that these people carried right from. The rule of thumb inside of a chapter record is definitely the person in debt really should live in california for two people years and years to make usage of which often state’s difference legislation. The chapter 7 bankruptcy trial is knowing and also witnesses that consumers advance so the person in debt may need to stay in your state they can be declaring bankruptcy for your largest part of One hundred and eighty nights as well as effectively one year. In case the chapter exceptions from a assert you should not move a person’s vessel you are able to utilize united states individual bankruptcy difference legislation.
Source: apollon.ws

Get Free Bankruptcy Advice for Filing Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Online

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: businessbankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Octomom files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection

Another striking aspect of this is the amount of debt.  We handle a lot of bankruptcies, but $1 million is a lot of debt.  Thankfully she did not have too much income, because with that much debt, she would not have been allowed to file for Chapter 13 bankruptcy in all likelihood.  Chapter 13 bankruptcy requires the repayment of some debt over a period of 36-60 months.  If you do not meet the income requirements for Chapter 7 bankruptcy, then you would next consider Chapter 13 bankruptcy and repay anywhere from 0% to 100% of your unsecured debt over the Chapter 13 plan period.  Many Chapter 13 bankruptcies result in payment of less than 15% of the underlying unsecured debt.  Although there are no income requirements for Chapter 13 eligibility, there are debt limits. 
Source: daytonbankruptcyblog.com

Octomom Broke, Files For Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Among her creditors, she lists Amir Haddadin (who owns her La Hambra home), Orkin Pest Control, Kaiser Permanete, the DMV, Sparkletts Bottled Water, Verizon Wireless, DirecTV and Sylvan Learning Center. Per court documents obtained by E! News, Nadya Suleman is filing for Chapter 7 bankruptcy protection, and states she is no longer able to pay her bills. According to the documents, Octomom has less than $50,000 in assets, and owes between $500,000 and $1 million in liabilities.
Source: inquisitr.com

Tampa Bankruptcy Court OKs Lien Stripping in Chapter 20 Without Discharge

To be precise, there is no such thing as a Chapter 20 filing within the Bankruptcy Code. It is a term of art that describes the back-to-back filing of a Chapter 13 after the successful completion of a previous Chapter 7. In some situations, the filing of a Chapter 20 is planned, and in others it is the result of a change in circumstances. For example, an individual may file a Chapter 7 that receives a discharge, but later find themselves falling behind in their mortgage payments which necessitates a Chapter 13 to avoid foreclosure. Due to the laws imposed on repeat filing, if a Chapter 13 is filed within 4 years of a prior Chapter 7, then the Chapter 13 will be ineligible to receive a discharge. Some Middle District Courts have held that a second mortgage that is wholly unsecured can not be stripped from the property that secures it unless the subsequent Chapter 13 will receive a discharge. See In re Gerardin, 447 B.R. 342 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011) and In re Quiros-Amy, 456 B.R. 140 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 2011)
Source: jtmlawfirm.com

‘Octomom,’ mom of 14, files for Chapter 7 bankruptcy

Under a Chapter 7 bankruptcy, a court-appointed trustee will go through and liquidate whatever assets Suleman has that can be used to pay off her creditors. Debtors like Suleman typically receive a discharge from most of their debts in a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, according to the federal courts website.
Source: ocregister.com

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Video: Will people know that I filed bankruptcy? – Logan Bankruptcy Lawyers

Bankruptcy filings rose sharply in the U.S. in February of 2012

Although many reports suggest that both employment rates and home prices are steadily rising, a representative for the American Bankruptcy Institute stated in a press release that unemployment coupled with the stagnant housing market led to the increase.  There are real indications that our economy is improving, but these numbers prove that many Americans, particularly Californians, are still struggling to overcome their debt.  I believe the increase in filings also reflects how many debtors tried their hardest to avoid filing bankruptcy, but ultimately realized that in these times it is not a battle they could win.
Source: california-bankruptcyattorney.com

Getting Your Driver’s License Back By Filing Bankruptcy in Ohio

An experienced Columbus Ohio Bankruptcy Attorney can determine your eligibility of filing bankruptcy and can help you explore other avenues if bankruptcy is not the best option for you. Legal counsel will ensure that your rights are protected and that someone is looking out for your best interest. The friendly Law Office of M. Sean Cydrus can help you craft a plan to rebuild your financial future. We understand the stress of financial worry. We use a personal approach to solving your financial challenges and are here to help you through this difficult time. We pride ourselves on the ability to provide our legal expertise with compassion and understanding. We can meet with you at our conveniently located offices in Columbus and Chillicothe. Call today for a free consultation. Help is one phone call away!
Source: ohiodebtsolutions.com

Filing bankruptcy to lift a wage garnishment

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of it’s author/creator and may not represent the views and opinions of “That RANT Chick” or 1800RANT.com.  The author of this post authenticates it’s originality in full by posting it. Any claim of copyright infringement may be addressed to the author via the process listed in the TOS of the website. The “website” is not liable for any copyright infringement of the independent authors who post articles on the “website”. This site contains materials from other media sources for the purpose of discussion stimulation and content enrichment among our readers only.This blog is for Entertainment Purposes Only!
Source: 1800rant.com

Will My Tax debt Become Discharged inside Bankruptcy?

As a new typical type of credit card debt relief, bankruptcy can end up being a legal method in which enables a debtor for you to liquidate their particular credit card debt or even consolidate and repay their particular debt. Unfortunately, this phenomenon actually is not uncommon, particularly provided the existing state associated with our economy. The elimination associated with tax credit card debt within bankruptcy may be any little tricky, and also I often prefer to meet together with customers to go more than the particular required documents with every other prior to I make the assessment of whether or perhaps not really this financial debt may be discharged. However, this indicates that just about all non exempt property is vulnerable to inclusion in the bankruptcy estate. To their particular personal detriment, I think which a amount of even postponed filing simply because of this anxiety.
Source: papermoney-maastricht.org

Cheap affordable southern california chapter 7 bankruptcies

Remember not all cases are the same. Some chapter 7 cases are indeed considered simple cases by most capable practitioners. Other chapter 7 cases can be very complex. There are chapter 7 cases where no capable attorney would take the case without informing the client that the case is complex and problematic from the start just to clue in the potential client on what to expect. For those attorneys who usually offer rock bottom pricing, they are often only jumping in on the practice of bankruptcy law due to our sluggish economy, and it is far from clear what level of preparation they undertook before holding themselves out as bankruptcy practitioners.
Source: jchfirm.com

Can Creditors Harass Me After I’ve Filed Bankruptcy In Los Angeles

It is a violation of the bankruptcy automatic stay for creditors to contact a person in bankruptcy about paying most debts incurred prior to the bankruptcy filing. If the debt collector received notice of the bankruptcy filing and continues their collection efforts, the bankruptcy code provides a remedy to the debtor being contacted.
Source: losangelesattorneylpmiv.com

Up To Million Americans Can’t Even Afford Bankruptcy

The cost of failure rose neatly following thoroughfare of a 2005 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, that introduced unconditional reforms to a failure process. These changes embody imperative credit conversing and financial preparation courses, additional authorised documents, increasing filing fees and an updated “means test” to establish failure eligibility. The weight of profitable for all of these combined requirements, including a increasing profession hours indispensable to ready a filing, falls to a debtor.
Source: ahipcup.com

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. Source: barstowwatch.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: bankruptcycourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: unitedstatesbankruptcycourtco.com Source: probatecourtco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: howtofilebankruptcyco.com Source: filebankruptcyco.com Source: bankruptcylawyersco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: probatecourtco.com
Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com

Video: Debt Management Tips : How to File Bankruptcy

NewsDaily: Dewey to consider bankruptcy filing: source

Bienenstock did not respond to a request for comment late on Friday. He was one of four members of Dewey’s top management team, the office of the chairman, to decamp to other firms in recent days, joining Proskauer Rose. The last member of that office, Washington, D.C., lobbyist L. Charles Landgraf, said he had joined Arnold & Porter on Wednesday.
Source: newsdaily.com

FILING BANKRUPTCY DOES NOT MEAN YOU WILL LOSE EVERYTHING

People are not required to forfeit all of their property when they file bankruptcy. Bankruptcy laws are intended to use individuals’ property to satisfy as many debts as is reasonably possible. The process is not intended to pauperize people. In order to avoid this result, bankruptcy law exempts certain property, up to a maximum value, from the bankruptcy estate. Property that is exempt from the estate is not forfeited in the bankruptcy. That means individuals may keep the exempt property even after they file bankruptcy, as long as the value of that property does not exceed the statutory limit. Federal law allows states to replace the federal exemption scheme with their own. New York allows individuals to choose between federal and state exemptions. Both federal and New York law essentially exempts the same types of property, but the two laws place different limits on each type. This means that people may be able to keep more of their property under one law rather than the other, depending on the types of property they own at the time they file bankruptcy.
Source: vaughnweberlaw.com

Chapter 7 filing fees a stretch for many who need debt relief

Some would say the intent of the 2005 bankruptcy amendments did not accomplish what was intended. For instance, while Chapter 7 and other filings did fall after the new law went into effect, the change in the rate of bankruptcies was minimal, from 1.4 percent in 2004 to 1.3 percent last year. The result is that the new regulations require more work, with a greater chance for dismissal of a petition if the requirements are not met. Nevertheless, it remains an important safeguard to those in Alabama and elsewhere who have seen their financial stability vanish and are searching for an orderly means to conquer debt and lay the groundwork for a new beginning.
Source: ericwilsonlaw.com

The costs of bankruptcy, the investment of debt relief

Recent media attention has shed light on the reality that bankruptcy can be costly.For many, the price of bankruptcy may seem too high, considering that filing is intended to help alleviate debt. Before making any decisions about bankruptcy, it is important to have a clear understanding of how it works, how it will affect your finances, your credit, and whether it is right for you. Despite upfront costs, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy may remain the solution you need to achieve debt relief.
Source: losangelescountybankruptcyattorneys.com

Can you be "too broke" to file bankruptcy?

Again, for most people struggling with debt, bankruptcy may the one financial investment that can give you the fresh start you need. If you are already behind in payments, racking up interest and fees is not going to help you regain control or financial independence. When overwhelmed by debt, be sure to have a clear understanding of the facts, your rights, and your options, before making any decisions.
Source: orlandobankruptcylawblog.com

Filing bankruptcy to lift a wage garnishment

The views and opinions expressed in this article are those of it’s author/creator and may not represent the views and opinions of “That RANT Chick” or 1800RANT.com.  The author of this post authenticates it’s originality in full by posting it. Any claim of copyright infringement may be addressed to the author via the process listed in the TOS of the website. The “website” is not liable for any copyright infringement of the independent authors who post articles on the “website”. This site contains materials from other media sources for the purpose of discussion stimulation and content enrichment among our readers only.This blog is for Entertainment Purposes Only!
Source: 1800rant.com

Understanding What A Personal Bankruptcy Means For You

After your bankruptcy goes through, avoid taking on new debt. There are lenders out there who will try to tempt you with high interest loans and credit cards which are directed towards people who have gone through the bankruptcy process. There are normally the strings attached of high interest rates. You need to maintain tight control over your finances following bankruptcy; using unfavorable credit offers can land you in serious debt trouble all over again.
Source: jameshouts2010.com

Filing Bankruptcy Because of Credit Cards in Ohio

I am a bankruptcy attorney in Phoenix ($995/Chapter 7), and occasionally have clients with businesses. If the owner can be held personally accountable for the business debts, and it is a smaller business, usually it is best to file for personal bankruptcy (Chapter 7 and 13). Otherwise, creditors can come after the individual. These are usually sole proprietorships, entrepreneurs, and partnerships that intend to dissolve, since if there are any assets they will be distributed amongst creditors. Businesses that are incorporated and a separate legal entity where an individual is not personally liable, and where there are significant assets, usually file for corporate bankruptcy, without including anyone personally (Chapter 11). A Chapter 11 will reorganize or liquidate the business in order to pay its debts. The debtor may propose its own restructuring plan, but after a certain amount of time has passed, the creditors get to propose alternative plans, and vote on which plan will be accepted. Usually by filing Chapter 11, a business intends to stay in business instead of dissolving. Although an individual will have a bankruptcy on their credit history if they file for personal bankruptcy, it is usually significantly cheaper to file for personal bankruptcy than corporate bankruptcy, which usually costs around $5000 or more. The Hassayampa Golf Course in Prescott, Arizona filed this year for Chapter 11 bankruptcy. This comes as no surprise considering the economy; recreational and luxury businesses are suffering severely. What appears to have gotten the golf course into financial difficulty was taxes, it owes $162,724.72 in taxes. Politicians call for higher taxes on businesses, but in this economy taxes are taking a toll on businesses. Generally, those taxes will not be dischargeable in the bankruptcy. There are also 1375 creditors listed on the bankruptcy petition. Many businesses cannot survive after a corporate bankruptcy, because they still must pay back much of the debt, and end up converting to a Chapter 7 bankruptcy and dissolving. Considering the economy is not picking up, I give Hassayampa a 50/50 chance at lasting another year after the bankruptcy. Read more about the Hassayampa bankruptcy here.  The Alexander Bankruptcy Law Firm provides low low cost Chapter 7 and 13 personal bankruptcies. $995 Chapter 7 or $2500 Chapter 13 bankruptcies plus court filing fee. Free consultation with a compassionate attorney who will handle your case personally. Call 24/7, available to meet with you around your schedule. 602-910-6812. Conveniently located in Central Phoenix along the Camelback corridor. AlexanderBankruptcyLawFirm.com Source: blogspot.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: whatisbankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com
Source: chapter9bankruptcyco.com

Filed 10/2/09 CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT DIVISION FOUR ANDREW BUESA et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent. B212854 (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC378215) APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County, Elihu M. Berle, Judge. Affirmed. Law Office of David W. Allor and David W. Allor for Plaintiffs and Appellants. Rockard J. Delgadillo and Carmen Trutanich, City Attorneys, and Paul L. Winnemore, Deputy City Attorney for Defendant and Respondent. _________________________ 2 This is an appeal from a judgment on the pleadings in an action against the City of Los Angeles (City)1 brought by two former Los Angeles police officers, Andrew Buesa and Michael Cardenas. Plaintiffs seek damages for a violation of their rights under the Public Safety Officers Procedural Bill of Rights Act (Gov. Code, § 3300 et seq. (POBRA)).2 The gravamen of their complaint is that a perjured declaration submitted by the City deprived them of their statute of limitations defense in an administrative mandamus proceeding over their discharges. The issue is whether they may maintain this as a separate action, or whether under the doctrine of collateral estoppel it is barred by the final judgment denying their petition for administrative mandamus. We conclude that plaintiffs‟ action under POBRA is barred because it constitutes an impermissible collateral attack on the mandate judgment. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL SUMMARY Since this matter is on appeal from a judgment on the pleadings, we take our factual summary from the allegations of the second amended complaint, which is the charging pleading. On February 2, 2002, plaintiffs participated in the arrest of a suspect following a car and foot chase. The same day, the Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD) learned of alleged acts of misconduct by plaintiffs arising from that arrest. The next day, Sergeant Joe Losorelli, of the LAPD Internal Affairs Group, was assigned to investigate the alleged misconduct. On August 15, 2002, Losorelli met with a deputy district attorney in the Los Angeles County District Attorney‟s Office for the purpose of seeking a determination whether criminal charges should be filed against plaintiffs based on the February 2002 incident. Losorelli met with the deputy district attorney again on October 2, 2002, at which time he provided a copy of his investigation and witness statements. 1 Police Chief William J. Bratton was a named defendant in the original complaint, but he was deleted in the second amended complaint, the charging pleading. He is not a party to this appeal. 2 Statutory references are to the Government Code unless otherwise indicated. 3 According to plaintiffs, the district attorney‟s office opened its criminal investigation against plaintiffs that day. POBRA provides a one-year statute of limitations for bringing of police misconduct charges. The time runs from discovery of the misconduct. (§ 3304, subd. (d).) Section 3304, subdivision (d)(1) tolls the limitations period while a criminal investigation or prosecution is pending. On December 2, 2002, Losorelli asked LAPD superiors to toll the statute of limitations against plaintiffs because of the pending criminal investigation. He asked that the period be tolled from his August 15, 2002 meeting with the district attorney‟s office until the conclusion of the criminal investigation. The criminal investigation was terminated on February 11, 2003, when the deputy district attorney in charge of the case elected not to seek a grand jury indictment. Personnel complaints against plaintiffs were filed at the Los Angeles Police Commission on August 3, 2003, alleging misconduct arising from the February 2002 arrest. They were served the next day. On August 3, 2004, a board of rights found plaintiffs guilty of misconduct and recommended that they be discharged. On September 29, 2004, the chief of police adopted the recommendation that plaintiffs be terminated for failure to report the use of force against a suspect. The chief signed orders removing them from employment, effective that day. Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of administrative mandamus (Code Civ. Proc., § 1094.5) on December 14, 2004 seeking review of their terminations. They alleged that Losorelli furnished a false declaration regarding tolling, which was used by defendant in responding to the petition. Allegedly, Losorelli knew that pursuant to a policy of LAPD and the district attorney‟s office, only the latter was authorized to open a criminal investigation against sworn personnel. According to the complaint, the district attorney‟s office opened the criminal investigation against plaintiffs on October 2, 2002. Plaintiffs allege: “Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that his investigation against plaintiffs was considered a criminal investigation from the beginning (as of February 2, 2002). Sergeant Losorelli knowingly and intentionally testified falsely that he first presented the case against plaintiffs to [the deputy district 4 attorney] for possible criminal filing at a July 31, 2002 meeting, when this meeting actually took place on August 15, 2002.” Allegedly, with knowledge that the August 3, 2003 personnel complaints against plaintiffs were time-barred, Losorelli presented a false declaration in the mandamus action “with the intent of fraudulently extending the tolling period for criminal investigations” authorized by section 3304, subdivision (d) “and with the malicious intent to deprive plaintiffs of their rights,” and further employment with the LAPD. According to plaintiffs, they discovered Losorelli‟s wrongful conduct on July 25, 2007, after the administrative mandamus proceeding was concluded. They do not explain the circumstances of that discovery. Plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate was denied by the trial court. The court found the weight of evidence at the administrative hearing supported the decision to terminate plaintiffs. It identified the application of the POBRA statute of limitations as “the main legal issue in the case.” The court noted that both sides had submitted documentary evidence and declarations on the limitations issue, and that no objection to this evidence was made by either side. The trial court found: “The disciplinary action against the petitioners is not barred by the limitations provision of the POBR” because of the tolling provision in section 3304, subdivision (d)(1). The court stated that charges were served on plaintiffs 18 months and two days after the alleged misconduct. It found: “The alleged misconduct was the subject of a criminal investigation that commenced on or before July 31, 2002, when an LAPD investigator met with the District Attorney regarding the matter, and which did not end until February 11, 2003, when the District Attorney decided not to ask the grand jury for an indictment because of the lack of evidence. The one-year limitation period was therefore tolled for six months and eleven days. The investigation was therefore completed and notice of charges were served upon the petitioner[s] within the 5 twelve month period required by section 3304(d).” No appeal was filed from the denial of the petition for administrative mandate and that order is now final.3 Plaintiffs filed their original complaint in this separate action seeking reinstatement on September 27, 2007. They filed a first amended complaint which was the subject of a successful motion for judgment on the pleadings. The motion was granted with leave to amend. Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint dropped the claim for reinstatement, and, instead sought damages against the City for violation of POBRA. City responded with a new motion for judgment on the pleadings. At the first hearing on the motion, the trial court requested additional briefing on whether perjury in a prior proceeding may be the basis for a collateral attack on the judgment. After supplemental briefing on that issue, a second hearing was held. The court found: “The gravamen of this lawsuit is an action under Government Code section 3309.5, but it‟s based upon plaintiffs‟ claim for perjury in the underlying action in the mandamus proceeding.” The court observed that the weight of California authority is that perjury is not a basis for collateral attack on a judgment. It found “that since the gravamen of the complaint in this case is perjury in a prior proceeding and further based upon the principles of law that perjury in a prior proceeding, which is intrinsic fraud, is not grounds for collateral attack, the court is going to grant the motion for judgment on the pleadings.” Judgment was entered in favor of City. This appeal followed. DISCUSSION “The standard of review for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is the same as that for a general demurrer: We treat the pleadings as admitting all of the material facts properly pleaded, but not any contentions, deductions or conclusions of fact or law contained therein. We may also consider matters subject to judicial notice. We review the complaint de novo to determine whether it alleges facts sufficient to state a cause of 3 Plaintiffs sued their former attorney for malpractice for promising, but failing, to appeal the denial of the writ petition. We are not informed of the outcome of that action. 6 action under any theory. [Citation.]” (Dunn v. County of Santa Barbara (2006) 135 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1298.) The issue presented is whether the action for damages under POBRA is barred by the final judgment following denial of plaintiffs‟ petition for writ of administrative mandate pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5. Plaintiffs argue they are not collaterally attacking the mandate judgment, which is final, and therefore the doctrines of finality of judgments and collateral estoppel do not apply. Their theory is that their procedural rights under POBRA were thwarted by the alleged perjury by Sergeant Losorelli. Rather than seeking reinstatement to the LAPD, plaintiffs now seek damages for emotional distress, lost earnings and benefits (including pensions), both past and future. They also seek a civil penalty of $25,000 under section 3309.5, and costs of suit. Finally, plaintiffs seek “an order of injunctive or extraordinary relief that the court deems necessary and just to prevent such future similar actions on the part of defendants against other employees.” A. POBRA POBRA “sets forth a list of basic rights and protections which must be afforded all peace officers (see § 3301) by the public entities which employ them. (§§ 3300 et seq.) „It is a catalogue of the minimum rights (§ 3310) the Legislature deems necessary to secure stable employer-employee relations (§ 3301).‟ (Baggett v. Gates (1982) 32 Cal.3d 128, 135.)” (Gales v. Superior Court (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1600, fns. omitted (Gales).) Plaintiffs‟ second amended complaint alleges an action under section 3309.5, which provides a private right of action for police officers who claim a violation of their rights under POBRA.4 4 In pertinent part, section 3309.5 provides: “(a) It shall be unlawful for any public safety department to deny or refuse to any public safety officer the rights and protections guaranteed to him or her by this chapter. [¶] . . . [¶] (c) The superior court shall have initial jurisdiction over any proceeding brought by any public safety officer against any public safety department for alleged violations of this chapter. [¶] (d)(1) In any case where the superior court finds that a public safety department has violated any of the provisions of this chapter, the court shall render appropriate injunctive or other 7 B. Availability of POBRA Cause Of Action City argues that plaintiffs have not stated a cause of action under POBRA because the alleged perjury was committed in the administrative mandamus proceedings after plaintiffs had been discharged from the LAPD. At that point, City argues, plaintiffs were no longer peace officers as defined by section 3301. Plaintiffs respond that the purpose of POBRA would be defeated if their rights are guaranteed only up to the point of discharge. We need not resolve whether a cause of action lies under POBRA based on a false declaration filed in an administrative mandamus proceeding because the time to challenge the declaration is in the Code of Civil Procedure section 1094.5 proceeding. A subsequent collateral attack on that basis is not allowed, as we next discuss. C. Finality of Adjudications The California Supreme Court examined the principles underlying the finality of judgments in Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Superior Court (1998) 18 Cal.4th 1 (Cedars-Sinai), in which it held that there is no separate tort for intentional spoliation of evidence. The court reviewed several cases that denied a tort remedy for the presentation of false evidence or suppression of evidence and observed these decisions “rest on a concern for the finality of adjudication.” (Id. at p. 10.) “This same concern underlies another line of cases that forbid direct or collateral attack on a judgment on the ground extraordinary relief to remedy the violation and to prevent future violations of a like or similar nature, including, but not limited to, the granting of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, or permanent injunction prohibiting the public safety department from taking any punitive action against the public safety officer. [¶] . . . [¶] (e) In addition to the extraordinary relief afforded by this chapter, upon a finding by the superior court that a public safety department, its employees, agents, or assigns, with respect to acts taken within the scope of employment, maliciously violated any provision of this chapter with the intent to injure the public safety officer, the public safety department shall, for each and every violation, be liable for a civil penalty not to exceed twenty-five thousand dollars ($25,000) to be awarded to the public safety officer whose right or protection was denied . . . . If the court so finds, and there is sufficient evidence to establish actual damages suffered by the officer whose right or protection was denied, the public safety department shall also be liable for the amount of the actual damages.” 8 that evidence was falsified, concealed, or suppressed. After the time for seeking a new trial has expired and any appeals have been exhausted, a final judgment may not be directly attacked and set aside on the ground that evidence has been suppressed, concealed, or falsified; . . . such fraud is „intrinsic‟ rather than „extrinsic.‟ [Citations.] Similarly, under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel, a judgment may not be collaterally attacked on the ground that evidence was falsified or destroyed. [Citations.]” (Ibid., italics added.) The claim that the judgment was based on forged documents or perjured testimony does not obviate the force of this policy favoring finality of judgments. As explained in Pico v. Cohn (1891) 91 Cal. 129, upon which the Supreme Court relied, “„[W]e think it is settled beyond controversy that a decree will not be vacated merely because it was obtained by forged documents or perjured testimony. The reason of this rule is, that there must be an end of litigation; and when parties have once submitted a matter . . . for investigation and determination, and when they have exhausted every means for reviewing such determination in the same proceeding, it must be regarded as final and conclusive . . . . [¶] . . . [W]hen [the aggrieved party] has a trial, he must be prepared to meet and expose perjury then and there. . . . The trial is his opportunity for making the truth appear. If, unfortunately, he fails, being overborne by perjured testimony, and if he likewise fails to show the injustice that has been done him on motion for a new trial, and the judgment is affirmed on appeal, he is without remedy. The wrong, in such case, is of course a most grievous one, and no doubt the legislature and the courts would be glad to redress it if a rule could be devised that would remedy the evil without producing mischiefs far worse than the evil to be remedied. Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse than occasional miscarriages of justice . . . .‟” (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11, italics added, quoting Pico v. Cohn, supra, 91 Cal. 129, 133-134; accord, United States v. Throckmorton (1878) 98 U.S. 61, 68-69.) 9 D. Intrinsic Fraud Courts traditionally have distinguished between extrinsic and intrinsic fraud, a distinction which “is of critical importance because intrinsic fraud cannot be used to overthrow a judgment, even where the party was unaware of the fraud at the time and did not have a chance to raise it at trial.” (Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc. (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 810, 828.) As we have discussed, the introduction of perjured testimony is a classic example of intrinsic fraud. (See also Kachig v. Boothe (1971) 22 Cal.App.3d 626, 634, cited with approval in Pour Le Bebe, Inc. v. Guess? Inc., supra, 112 Cal.App.4th at p. 828.) Plaintiffs argue these principles do not apply because their second amended complaint does not seek to invalidate the denial of the mandate petition and does not seek their reinstatement. They characterize the two actions: “The prior action litigated whether [plaintiffs] were entitled to equitable relief because inter alia the City of Los Angeles brought charges against them beyond the one year statute of limitations. The present action seeks statutory penalties and damages for a different and distinct violation of Government Code § 3309.5 by an employee of the City of Los Angeles.” They rely on Corral v. State Farm Mutual Auto. Ins. Co. (1979) 92 Cal.App.3d 1004 (Corral). Corral arose out of an uninsured motorist arbitration between an insured and her insurer. The insurer refused to stipulate that the third party involved in the accident with the insured was uninsured. The arbitration was continued to allow the insured to obtain evidence that the third party was uninsured or to obtain a stipulation to that effect. When neither was obtained, counsel for the insured submitted on the evidence produced at the hearing. The arbitrator found for the insurer. Six weeks later the insured sought to reopen the arbitration based on a new declaration from the third party stating that he was uninsured. The request was denied on the ground the arbitrator lacked authority to grant the relief requested. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1007-1008.) The insured‟s motion in the superior court to vacate the arbitration award was denied as untimely, a ruling that was affirmed by the Court of Appeal. (Id. at p. 1008.) 10 The insured then filed a separate action against the insurer for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing. In it, she alleged that at all times the insurer knew that the third party was uninsured, and fraudulently contended at the arbitration hearing that he was insured. In opposition to the defense motion for summary judgment, counsel for the insured submitted his declaration in which he stated that a claims manager for the insured had told him before the arbitration that the insurer would treat the claim as an uninsured motorist case. The attorney declared that, in reliance on these assurances, he made no effort to obtain evidence of the third party‟s lack of insurance coverage. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1008-1009.) The Corral court rejected the insurer‟s argument that the bad faith action was barred by either res judicata or the policies underlying finality of judgments. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at p. 1009.) Instead, it held that each proceeding was based on a different claim of right: the arbitration proceeding was brought to recover benefits under the uninsured motorist provision of the insurance contract; the bad faith cause of action was not based on facts surrounding the automobile collision or the terms of the insurance policy, but on bad faith (refusal to acknowledge that the third party motorist was uninsured) committed after the collision. The court concluded that the bad faith claim constituted a different cause of action, and so was not barred by collateral estoppel. (Id. at pp. 1011-1012.) It held that the bad faith action was “not a collateral attack upon the arbitrator‟s award as it is not directed toward directly preventing the enforcement of that award or defeating rights acquired under it.” (Id. at p. 1013.) The court in Corral acknowledged a then recent case that reached a different result, but disagreed with its holding. The case was Rios v. Allstate Ins. Co. (1977) 68 Cal.App.3d 811, which held that the doctrine of finality of judgments barred a separate action for bad faith alleging that in an arbitration between insurer and insured, the insurer had presented false evidence and testimony. (Corral, supra, 92 Cal.App.3d at pp. 1012-1014.) But Rios (and several other decisions) were cited with approval by our Supreme Court in Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at page 10. Of course, the Corral court did not 11 have the benefit of the Supreme Court‟s reasoning in Cedars-Sinai, which was decided some 19 years later. Plaintiffs do not cite or discuss Rios, but argue that Corral should apply because in that case, as in this one, the facts giving rise to the second action occurred during the first proceeding. They contend: “As demonstrated in Corral, it is the extraordinary obligations of the defendant that allows the second action to proceed. In that case, it was the insurance company‟s obligation of good faith and fair dealing. . . . Similarly, in the present case the City of Los Angeles cannot get away with its conduct at the hearing on the writ where it presented the perjurous [sic] declaration because it had an independent obligation not to violate [plaintiffs‟] rights under Government Code, § 3309.5.” Here, to prevail in their action for damages, plaintiffs had to prove a violation of POBRA based upon defendant‟s reliance on a perjured declaration to show that the tolling of the time to file disciplinary actions lasted long enough to render their discharges timely. This goes to the heart of the trial court‟s finding in the mandate proceeding. To the extent that Corral stands for the proposition that the finality of judgments doctrine does not apply to a separate bad faith action arising from the presentation of false or perjured testimony in an earlier proceeding, we disagree, and instead follow Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th 1 and Rios, supra, 68 Cal.App.3d at pp. 818-819. Plaintiffs also rely on Miller v. Campbell, Warburton, Fitzsimmons, Smith, Mendel & Pastore (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1331 (Miller). In that case, the executor of an estate hired a law firm to represent her in connection with her duties. At the conclusion of the probate matter, the firm requested and was awarded its fees except for one category which the probate court found to involve work for the executor in her individual capacity. The firm did not appeal that decision. Instead, it filed a new action seeking quantum meruit recovery of the denied fees directly from the client. The trial court held the action was barred by the final judgment in the probate case. The Court of Appeal reversed. Significantly, it found that the probate court did not decide that the law firm was not entitled to the additional fees, but only that the fees were not payable out of the estate. 12 (Id. at p. 1341.) As the Miller court explained, the probate court never ruled on the firm‟s entitlement to fees directly from its client, and therefore there was no basis for collateral estoppel. (Id. at p. 1343.) The case before us is quite different. The court ruled on the tolling issue in the mandate proceeding. Indeed it was the central question in the case. “„Collateral estoppel precludes the relitigation of an issue only if (1) the issue is identical to an issue decided in a prior proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated; (3) the issue was necessarily decided; (4) the decision in the prior proceeding is final and on the merits; and (5) the party against whom collateral estoppel is asserted was a party to the prior proceeding or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Lucido v. Superior Court (1990) 51 Cal.3d 335, 341.)‟ (Zevnik v. Superior Court (2008) 159 Cal.App.4th 76, 82.)” (Plumley v. Mockett (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1031, 1048-1049.) That describes the present case. Because the tolling issue was actually litigated in the mandate proceeding, a new claim based on the allegedly perjured declaration is a collateral attack on the mandate decision. Perjured testimony cannot be the basis for a separate proceeding. (Cedars-Sinai, supra, 18 Cal.4th at pp. 10-11.) In light of our conclusion, we need not and do not address City‟s other arguments. DISPOSITION The judgment is affirmed. City is to have its costs on appeal. CERTIFIED FOR PUBLICATION. EPSTEIN, P. J. We concur: WILLHITE, J. MANELLA, J. 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Video: Will a Bankruptcy Filing Stop Foreclosure on My Home? – Bankruptcy Lawyers Riverside

Cheap affordable southern california chapter 7 bankruptcies

Remember not all cases are the same. Some chapter 7 cases are indeed considered simple cases by most capable practitioners. Other chapter 7 cases can be very complex. There are chapter 7 cases where no capable attorney would take the case without informing the client that the case is complex and problematic from the start just to clue in the potential client on what to expect. For those attorneys who usually offer rock bottom pricing, they are often only jumping in on the practice of bankruptcy law due to our sluggish economy, and it is far from clear what level of preparation they undertook before holding themselves out as bankruptcy practitioners.
Source: jchfirm.com

California Bankruptcy Law: Articles by Attorney Heather A. Cutler

There may be other reasons to file a bankruptcy earlier than the deadlines permit, so I still recommend that you seek out bankruptcy advice if you feel that you really do need to file for bankruptcy soon.  These deadlines apply only if you are seeking a discharge of your current debts, and received a discharge in your past bankruptcy case.
Source: hcutlerlaw.com

The costs of bankruptcy, the investment of debt relief

Recent media attention has shed light on the reality that bankruptcy can be costly.For many, the price of bankruptcy may seem too high, considering that filing is intended to help alleviate debt. Before making any decisions about bankruptcy, it is important to have a clear understanding of how it works, how it will affect your finances, your credit, and whether it is right for you. Despite upfront costs, Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy may remain the solution you need to achieve debt relief.
Source: losangelescountybankruptcyattorneys.com

Bankruptcy Fees: California Bankruptcy Court Eastern District

Obtaining a discharge under chapter 7, the procedure roughly take 4-5 months. In the california bankruptcy court eastern district of each of the limited sales yet your high interest loans or debts will not take your clothes, kitchen utensils, or seldom your car. What the california bankruptcy court eastern district for is often between Chapter 7 works out to around $200 and Chapter 13 bankruptcy makes it possible for a while when you find many items on your case. In the california bankruptcy court eastern district in more trouble than you already are in. You may be very beneficial to discuss your situation with a couple who are taking the california bankruptcy court eastern district of these things.
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The Effect of Recent Prior Bankruptcy Filings on the “Automatic Stay” : California Bankruptcy Blog

401K 401K distribution bankruptcy 401K Loan 401K withdrawl bankruptcy asset protection attorneys fees automatic stay bank of america credit card lawsuit bankruptcy bankruptcy information can you be sued for credit card debt can you be sued for mastercard debt capital one credit card lawsuit chapter 7 bankruptcy Chapter 13 chapter 13 bankruptcy chase credit card lawsuit citibank credit card lawsuit credit card lawsuit credit card lawsuit california credit union cross-collaterization debt dischargeable divorce divorce decree fight credit card lawsuit filing for bankruptcy IRA lawyers fees loan modification mastercard lawsuit non dischargeable property settlement public information public notice Retirement secured separation separation agreement social security social security disability tax refund visa lawsuit who will know
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Chapter 7 bankruptcy filed by a California Federal Judge

Even a federal judge is being hit hard by the tough economy these days. U.S. District Judge Otis Wright and his wife have filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy because they cannot pay their existing debts. Mr. Wright and his wife filed Chapter 7 bankruptcy late last year in Los Angeles. A Chapter 7 or Chapter 13 bankruptcy proceeding can take anywhere from four to six months.
Source: sanfrancisco-bankruptcy-attorney.com

Alexander Bankruptcy Law Firm: Foreclosures Fall…And That’s a Bad Thing?

A new report came out this week with a curious headline: “Foreclosure Activity Declines, Hurting Investors.” I read it twice. You would think declines in foreclosure activity would be a good thing, that is, would help, not hurt. Not in this bizarre housing market. The report is from Foreclosure Radar, a foreclosure sales and analytics website. Foreclosure starts, the first stage in the foreclosure process, fell in April in the hardest hit states of California, Arizona and Nevada, according to Foreclosure Radar. California saw the steepest slide, with Notice of Default filings down nearly 16% from a year ago and nearly 70% from the peak in March of 2009. Foreclosure sales (sales of these properties at the courthouse steps, not sales of already bank-owned, or REO, properties) also declined, as the investor share of these purchases soared to a record high. “Nevada investors purchased more than 50% of foreclosure sales for the first time at 50.7%,” according to the Foreclosure Radar report. “The low number of sales, combined with a record percent purchased on the courthouse steps, left very little to become Bank Owned (REO). This further depletes the inventory of Bank Owned homes, as REO sales continue to outpace the addition of new inventory.” Read the rest of the article at The Street
Source: blogspot.com

‘Octomom’ Seeks Debt Relief by Filing for Chapter 7 Bankruptcy

Public scrutiny. Soon, media outlets began questioning Suleman’s ability to raise 14 children as a single mother. Suleman eventually admitted to ABC News that she was receiving between $4,000 and $5,000 each month in public assistance, but this may not have been enough to provide for her massive family.
Source: clearbankruptcy.com

Octomom’s California house to be sold in foreclosure auction

In addition to stopping the foreclosure process, California bankruptcy laws also require all other creditors to halt the collection of unpaid debts while an individual is in the midst of bankruptcy proceedings. This also means that creditors cannot attempt to repossess any other property that may be securing loans such as vehicles or boats. These laws are meant to protect consumers while they work out a bankruptcy plan that will put them in a much better financial situation once the bankruptcy is finalized.
Source: bankruptcysandiegoattorney.com

New Jersey business bankruptcy filings drop for second year

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